Guilty Minds Lab

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CAUSATION, FORESEEABILITY, AND NORMS








CENTRAL QUESTIONS

What is the <u>ordinary meaning</u> of the lemma "cause"? What are the mechanisms of our <u>causal</u> <u>cognition</u>? Why does it matter?


THE NORM EFFECT



The norm-violating agent is deemed <u>the</u> cause of the outcome.

But: Philosophers take causation to be a descriptive notion. How come <u>injunctive</u> (*i.e.*, prescriptive or evaluative) norms play a role for the folk?

TWO EXPLANATIONS



Do the folk misapply a <u>descriptive</u> concept or do they correctly apply an alternate, <u>normative</u> one?

THE IDEA

To distinguish the BV from the RV, we must elicit <u>blame sans moral responsibility</u>.

Thus: We test violations of <u>nonpertinent</u> and <u>silly</u> norms.

STUDY 1

Mark is rollerblading on a path, <u>Lauren</u> walks ahead. Suddenly, a <u>cat</u> appears. Lauren jumps into Mark's lane, colliding and sustaining injuries.

Nonpertinent: Rollerbladers must wear a helmet. Mark is not wearing one.


Silly: Rollerbladers must wear a grey shirt. Mark is wearing a blue one.

DISCUSSION

Levin Güver (UZH) & Markus Kneer (UZH)

Violating a silly norm is entirely <u>peripheral</u> to one's <u>moral responsibility</u>, and yet the Norm Effect arises.

And: It cannot be explained by a heightening in Mark's <u>foreknowledge</u> or <u>desire</u>, rendering the following schema false:



But: What about <u>foreseeability</u>?

STUDY 2

Same *Rollerblading* vignette as before, but asking about the <u>foreseeability</u> of an accident both <u>ex ante</u> and <u>ex post</u>.

RESULTS ex post ■ No norm Nonpertinent ■ Silly d=.68 *** d=.72 *** d=.64 *** d=.42 **d=.78 *** d=.78 *** d=.78 *** d=.78 *** Foreseeability Responsibility Mark Blame ex ante ■ No norm Nonpertinent $d=.14 \ ns$ Silly d=.65 *** d=.64 *** d=.53 *** d=.07 nsd=.56 *** d=.76 ***d=.74 *** Foreseeability Blame Mark Responsibility

DISCUSSION


The <u>ex post</u> results may suggest that it is foreseeability driving the effect, yet the <u>ex ante</u> data reveals that the effect persists even where <u>no difference in foreseeability</u> can be found.

Further: The difference in foreseeability ex post but not ex ante suggests a hindsight bias.


Practical implications?

CAUSATION IN THE LAW

Causation lies at the heart of both <u>criminal</u> and <u>tortious</u> liability.



It is assessed in <u>two steps</u>:



Scholars disagree both as to how legal causation <u>is</u> assessed (practice) and how it <u>ought to be</u> assessed (nature).

Practice

		Descriptive	Normative
Nature	Descriptive	Formalism	Weak realism
	Normative		Strong realism

THE CORRESPONDENCE ASSUMPTION

The law assumes the meaning of certain <u>legal</u> expressions E to be equivalent to the <u>folk usage</u> of E, passing the buck to the folk.



Supreme Court

Burrage v. United States (2014)

Courts should rely on "the common understanding of causation" and what it "is natural to say."

House of Lords

Alphacell Ltd v Woodward (1972)

"What or who caused an event to occur is essentially a practical question of fact which can best be answered by ordinary common sense than abstract metaphysical theory."

CONCLUSION

Peripheral factors play a considerable role in the processes that underlie the Norm Effect and cannot be explained away by means of foreknowledge, desire, or foreseeability, thus strengthening the BV.

This <u>bias</u> has serious downstream consequences for the <u>law</u>, irrespective of which doctrinal position one takes.



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